The Torture of Abu Zubaydah

Abu Zubaydah fought against the Soviet backed communist government of Afghanistan. He received a head injury during a battle that wiped out his memory. His fellow Islamist fighters helped him remember who he was. To help himself remember who he was, Zubaydah kept a diary.

According to The Black Banners by former FBI agent Ali Soufan, Abu Zubaydah was captured in a raid on a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan conducted by Pakistani forces and the CIA in March 2002. He was flown to another country to be interrogated by the CIA. FBI agents, including Ali Soufan were sent to assist in the interrogations. The CIA’s Counterintelligence Center (CTC) did not believe that the person in CIA custody was Zubaydah and did not come. The local CIA team did not know anything about Zubaydah. The FBI team did the initial interrogations instead.

Zubaydah had been gravely injured during the battle that led to his capture. FBI and CIA agents pretended that they and Abu Zubaydah were US soldiers as they took him to a local hospital. The FBI interrogations continued at the hospital.

Then the CIA Counterintelligence Center agents arrived. Zubaydah was sent back to the CIA prison. He was stripped naked, forced to listen to loud music for hours on end, and subjected to sleep deprivation.

In December 2007 CIA agent John Kiriakou was interviewed by ABC News. Kiriakou said that he participated in the raid that captured Abu Zubaydah. He said that in the room Zubaydah was in when the raid began, Zubaydah and two other men were building a bomb.

Kiriakou said that he was reassigned before Zubaydah was subjected to enhanced interrogation techniques. He also said that after Zubaydah was waterboarded for 30 to 35 seconds he agreed to cooperate with interrogators.

In 2009 the Obama Administration declassified a 2005 Justice Department legal memo that said that Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times.

Abu Zubaydah was sent to Guantanamo in September 2006 to be prosecuted for terrorist activities against the United States.

At his March 2007 CSRT Zubaydah said that taking and keeping his diary from him was worse than his treatment by the CIA. He said that not having his diary caused him to have nearly 40 seizures. He said that it was like his child. (Page 25)

At his CSRT Zubaydah said that he made false statements under torture. (Page 24)

In January 2010 Obama’s Guantanamo task force recommended Abu Zubaydah for prosecution. 

Abu Zubaydah

ISN: 10016

Nationality: Ethnic Palestinian born in Saudi Arabia

The story of Abu Zubaydah is a frustratingly complicated one. In this summary I have done my best to avoid unreliable evidence. Fire Dog Lake has done a good job dissecting the apparent contradictions in Abu Zubaydah’s DAB. The introduction to this set of summaries explains some of the terms used below. My sources are cited in the text below, but if any of my sources are inaccurate or misleading, then my summary will be as well.

KSM and Ibn al Shaykh al Libi said that Abu Zubaydah was a member of Al Qaeda. In his book, The Black Banners, former FBI agent Ali Soufan said that Abu Zubaydah admitted to being a high ranking member of Al Qaeda under torture even though he wasn’t a member of Al Qaeda (page 424). KSM and al Shaykh were also tortured by the CIA.

On December 14, 1999 Ahmed Ressam was captured attempting to enter the US with parts that could be used to build explosive devises. He said that he planned to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve 1999.

Abu Zubaydah’s DAB says that Ressam said that Zubaydah encouraged him and helped him facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

The Unclassified Summary of Evidence presented at Abu Zubyadah’s CSRT stated that Ressam had said that he trained at the Khaldan militant training camp in Afghanistan. Ressam also said that Abu Zubaydah facilitated terrorist attacks. Ressam said trainers at Khaldan indicated that viable targets included US warships, hotels hosting conferences of VIPs, barracks of US military personnel, commercial and economic targets, petroleum targets, and information technology centers.

At his CSRT Abu Zubaydah said that he was responsible for facilitating the travel of students to Khaldan and to conflict zones, like Chechnya and Bosnia, to fight after they were trained, or back to normal lives.

Zubaydah also said that Khaldan trained Muslims to defend against non-Muslim invaders anywhere in the world. He cited the wars between the Soviet Union and Islamist fighters in Afghanistan, Serbia and Bosnia, Russia and Chechnya, and Israel and Palestine. He says that at Khaldan they taught their recruits to only attack military targets. He said that he disagreed with the decision to attack innocent civilians like those who were in the World Trade Center on 9/11.

The 9/11 commission said that two of the 9/11 highjackers were trained at Khaldan. The British paper The Observer reported that al-Owhali, one of the bombers who participated in the 1998 US East Africa embassy bombings, trained at Khaldan.

At his CSRT Zubaydah said that he believed Khaldan was closed by the Taliban because Bin Laden wanted all of the militants to be trained at his training camp.

At his CSRT, Zubaydah said that he was an enemy of the US government.

“I have been an enemy of yours since I was a child because of your unjust acts against my people, the Palestinians, through your help and partnership with Israel in occupying our land and by killing our men and raping our women and kicking out our people and turning them into refugees for more than 60 years. […] My moral position is not against the American people or America, but against the government which I see as a partner in oppression.”

In 2013 Al Jazeera obtained a copy of the FBI’s English language translation of Abu Zubaydah’s dairy. His diary contained his reaction to the 9/11 attacks.

“Happiness was not enough, as soon as the news came out on the radio, lambs were slaughtered, and juice and sweets were distributed for several days, and then, preparations started for the counter attack… News on the radio reflected American threats and preparation, close to a world war, while we were in a state of elation that only God knows.” (Part 6 page 14)

No mention was made of an opposition to the killing of civilians in the World Trade Center.

His diary also shows how he helped prepare for counter attacks after 9/11.

“I have been in Khost since a week ago, in the setting of the security and military preparations platform which Sheikh Bin Ladin is doing, to confront any American military landing…Work is at its highest degree, buying weapons, arming those without a weapon, storing weapons, preparing locations and lines of confrontation, and preparing ambushes.” (Part 6 page 15)

About a month before his capture in March 2002, Abu Zubaydah described in his diary ways that he wished to, “wage war against America.” These included instigating a war between the races, preparing timed explosives, starting timed fires, simultaneous explosions, and burning fuel and gas trucks. (Part 6 page 89)

Mohamedou Ould Slahi

ISN: 760

Nationality: Mauritanian

This summary of the evidence against Mohamedou Slahi is based largely on the ruling in his 2010 habeas corpus case. I summarized the history of the habeas corpus rights of the prisoners at Guantanamo for National Security Stories.

Slahi trained at Al Qaeda’s Al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan in late 1990 and early 1991. Slahi pledged loyalty to Al Qaeda in 1991. He said that he went to Afghanistan to fight the communists and also said that he fought for Al Qaeda in the battle of Gardez in 1992. Slahi says he severed his ties with Al Qaeda in 1992.

The decision in Slahi’s 2010 habeas case says that, “there is ample evidence in this record that Slahi was subjected to extensive and severe mistreatment at Guantanamo from mid-June 2003 to September 2003.”

During his Habeas case, the US government argued that in October 1999 Slahi recruited two of the highjackers and one of the organizers of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Judge Roberston concluded that based upon the available evidence, “the government has credibly shown, and Slahi has not rebutted, the showing that Slahi provided lodging for three men for one night at his home in Germany, that one of them was Ramzi bin al Shibh, and that there was discussion of jihad and Afghanistan.”

Slahi’s habeas ruling also says that, “Salahi continued to be in touch with people he knew to be al Qaeda members, and […] was willing to refer would-be jihadists to them when the opportunity arose.”

The US government believes that Slahi’s cousin, Abu Hafs, was a member of Al Qaeda. Slahi transferred 4 thousand dollars to Hafs twice, once in December 1997 and once in December 1998. During a coercive interrogation, Slahi said that he transferred the money in order to support Al Qaeda. He later said that he was only helping Hafs send money to his family in Mauritania. 

Slahi lived in Canada from November 1999 to January 2000. During that time an Al Qaeda cell in Canada launched the “millennium plot,” a failed attempt to bomb the Los Angeles International Airport on New Years Eve 1999.

In November 2001 Slahi was arrested by Mauritanian authorities. He was then sent to Jordan. He was transferred to US custody in July 2002. He was sent to Guantanamo in August 2002.

Slahi was recommended for prosecution by Obama’s Guantanamo task force in January 2010. Slahi won his habeas case in March 2010.  In November 2010 the DC appeals court ordered the district court to rehear Slahi’s case using a different legal standard.

Mohamedou Slahi provided a copy of his memoirs to the online newsmagazine Slate. He remains at Guantanamo to this day. 

Saifullah Paracha

ISN: 1094

Nationality: Pakistani

The following is a summary of the allegations against Saifullah Paracha found in publicly available US military documents. If US military documents about this prisoner are inaccurate or misleading then this summary will be as well. The introduction to this set of summaries explains some of the terms used below. Saifullah’s son Uzair Paracha was convicted of material support for terrorism in a federal court.

Saifullah Paracha was a Pakistani businessman.

KSM said that Saifullah, Ammar al Baluchi and Majid Khan discussed a plan for al-Qaeda to use Saifullah’s textile business to smuggle explosives, specifically C4, into the US.  KSM said the explosives would have been shipped in containers Saifullah used to ship women’s and children’s clothing into the US.

At his ARB Saifullah said that this allegation, “is absolutely baseless.” He said that his company only facilitated agreements between buyers and sellers of textiles, and that it did not ship any goods itself.

A statement from Majid Khan was presented at Saifullah’s ARB saying that Khan was not aware of a plan to use Paracha’s company to smuggle chemicals.

KSM said that Saifullah told al-Baluchi that he believed he could obtain unspecified chemicals from Chinese sources. KSM said that he assumed Saifullah was talking about chemical or biological weapons. KSM said that plans for shipping explosives into the US included transporting them with legitimate items in regular shipping containers, as Saifullah said that the containers would not be opened. Saifullah’s DAB says that he admitted advising al-Baluchi on methods to smuggle chemicals into the US. At his ARB Saifullah said that he didn’t know anything about the shipping regulations of the US.

Saifullah’s DAB says that he explained to KSM his plan to have Osama Bin Laden read Koranic verses on his broadcast network.

At his ARB, Saifullah said he met with someone who was going to meet with Osama bin Laden and proposed to him to have Osama record programs in English based on Koranic verses.

Al-Baluchi said he used Saifullah’s TV studio to record a video of an al-Qaeda fighter discussing his experience fighting at Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The video was then given to Al Jazeera.

At his ARB, Saifullah said that al-Baluchi was allowed to use his company’s studio to test the equipment for a discussion program.

KSM said that he gave Saifullah between 500 thousand to 600 thousand dollars for safekeeping.  Al Balucci said that in November 2002 KSM told him to retrieve the money from Saifullah.

At his ARB, Saifullah said that he referred KSM to a bank his company used to set up a bank account.

Saifullah’s DAB says that when he was arrested he had his SF-5580 Casio digital diary with him. The digital diary contained references to chemical, biological, and nerve agents Saifullah had recorded. The chemicals referenced included Sarin, Soman, and Cyclosarin.

This specific allegation about the chemical agents was not presented to Saifullah at his ARB for him to respond to.

Al Baluchi said that Saifullah did not know that he or KSM were members of Al Qaeda.

At his ARB Saifullah said that he did not know that Al Baluchi or KSM were members of Al Qaeda.

At his CSRT KSM said that made false statements as a result of torture.

Saifullah Paracha was arrested in July 2003 in Thailand. He was transferred to Guantanamo in September 2004. He was recommended for prosecution by Obama's Guantanamo task force in January 2010.

Uzair Paracha

I am not a lawyer, but if I were to give one piece of advice to terrorism defendants, it would be to take a plea deal if it is offered.

In November 2005 Uzair Paracha was prosecuted for material support for terrorism, among other charges.

Majid Khan was a US resident who returned to Pakistan in 2002 to visit his wife without giving required notice to the American Immigration Department. At Uzair’s trial, prosecutors argued that Uzair posed as Khan in order to give immigration authorities the impression that Khan had not left the U.S. Prosecutors said that Uzair posed as Khan while on the phone with immigration authorities, used Khan’s bank cards, and also agreed to obtain travel documents for Khan and bring them back to Pakistan.

Prosecutors argued that if Khan had been able to return to the United States, he would have attempted to enact a terrorist plot to blow up gas stations in the US.

At the trial both the prosecution and defense agreed that Majid Khan was a member of Al Qaeda. Uzair said that at the time he made the call, he did not know that Khan was a member of Al Qaeda. Prosecutors argued that he did.

Among Uzair’s belongings, US investigators found Khan’s bank card, social security card, driver’s license, and a handwritten list of instructions from Khan directing Paracha on how to pose as Khan when talking to the Immigration department. US investigators also found that Uzair had a key to the post office box where Khan’s immigration documents were to be sent.

Prosecutors said that Uzair admitted to the FBI that he had known about Khan’s terrorist connections when he made the call. One of Uzair’s Defense attorneys, Edward Wilford, said the FBI had denied Paracha food and sleep and strip searched him during endless hours of questioning, “the ideal conditions to create a false confession.''

Uzair’s defense attorneys were not allowed to question Majid Khan or Ammar al-Baluchi, another accused Al Qaeda member, even though both were in CIA custody at the time. A statement created from US interrogations of the two men was provided to the defense. The statement said that the two members had said that, “neither Paracha nor his father, knowingly aided al-Qaeda.”

Uzair was offered a 22 month plea deal that amounted to little more than the prison time he had already served. Uzair turned down the plea deal and insisted on his innocence.

In November 2005 Uzair was convicted of material support for terrorism, conspiracy to provide material support for terrorism, providing funds, goods, or services to Al Qaeda, conspiracy to provide funds, goods, or services to Al Qaeda, and identification documents fraud committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism.

In July 2006 Uzair was sentenced to 30 years in prison. 

The Allegations Against Mohammad Al Qahtani

ISN: 063

Nationality: Saudi

The following is a summary of the allegations against Mohammad Al Qahtani found in publicly available US military documents. If US military documents about this prisoner are inaccurate or misleading then this summary will be as well. The introduction to this set of summaries explains some of the terms used below.  

Mohammad Al Qahtani is accused of attempting to be a highjacker in the 9/11 attacks.

Mohammad arrived at the Orlando International Airport on August 4, 2001. Immigration officials noted that he did not have a return ticket. He contradicted himself in his answers to their questions. He was denied entry into the US and returned to Dubia via London. 

Mohammad was captured fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan with other suspected Al Qaeda members by Pakistani forces in December 2001.

Mohammad told US interrogators he attended 2 Al Qaeda training camps, Al Faruq, and Tarnak Farm.

KSM, the self-proclaimed mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, identified Mohammad as an intended 9/11 highjacker. Mustafa Al Hawsawi, a defendant in the 9/11 trial,  said that Mohammad Atta called him with instructions to make reservations and buy airline tickets to Orlando, Florida for 5 individuals, including Mohammad.

Soon after arriving at Guantanamo, Mohammad confessed to attempting to be a 9/11 highjacker.

This confession, however, was obtained through torture. He later retracted this confession. He now says he had no plans to participate in the 9/11 attacks.

As I explained in the previous post, Mohammad was tortured extensively at Guantanamo. KSM was waterboarded by the CIA 183 times. Hawsawi was also tortured by the CIA. If the claims made by these individuals about Mohammad were obtained through torture, as they almost certainly were, they would be inadmissible in court. They would also be completely unreliable. People who are tortured will say whatever they believe their captors want to hear in order to make their torture stop.

That only leaves the circumstantial evidence about Mohammad being denied entry into the US in August 2001 and his capture by Pakistani forces, hardly enough to prosecute him in a court of law.

The FBI was sent in to interrogate prisoners who had been tortured by the CIA after they arrived at Guantanamo, in the hope that those interrogations could be used in court. The Washington Post said that these “clean teams” concluded that Mohammad Al Qahtani attempted to be a highjacker in the 9/11 attacks. It did not say on what evidence this conclusion was based.

Former Chief Prosecutor at Guantanamo Colonel Morris Davis believed that he could build a compelling case against Mohammad Al Qahtani without using anything he said in US custody. Davis believed that due to Mohammad’s mistreatment anything he had said was unreliable.

Convening Authority Susan Crawford did not think there was enough evidence to prosecute Mohammad in court. In 2008 Crawford did not allow charges to be brought against him due to his torture.

She told the Washington Post, "there's no doubt in my mind he would've been on one of those planes had he gained access to the country in August 2001. He's a muscle hijacker. . . . He's a very dangerous man. What do you do with him now if you don't charge him and try him? I would be hesitant to say, 'Let him go.' "

In May 2009 Obama gave a speech on national security where he said, “there may be a number of people who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the United States.”

In January 2010 Mohammad Al Qahtani was recommended for prosecution by Obama’s Guantanamo task force. 

The Torture of Mohammad Al Qahtani

This article relies heavily on the summary of Mohammad Al Qahtani’s interrogation logs found in “Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power” by Joseph Marguiles, a defense attorney who has represented Guantanamo prisoners. I could not more highly recommend this book for those who are interested in understanding Guantanamo.

In Jun 2005, Time Magazine published a US military interrogation log of Mohammad Al Qahtani, documenting his interrogations at Guantanamo from late November 2002 through January 2003.

He was often woken up at 4 AM and interrogated until midnight. For 48 of the 54 days detailed in the document, Mohammad was interrogated 18 to 20 hours a day. If he fell asleep during the interrogation, he awoke to water being splashed on him.

He was repeatedly and deliberately dehumanized by his interrogators. He was told that, “no one loved, cared, or remembered him.” He was, “reminded that he was less than human and that animals had more freedom and love than he does.”

Afterward, he was, “taken to see a family of banana rats. The banana rats were moving around freely, playing, eating, showing concern for one another. Detainee was compared to the family of banana rats and reinforced that they had more love, freedom, and concern than he had. Detainee began to cry during this comparison.”

Mohammad was, “told a dog is held in higher esteem because dogs know right from wrong and know to protect innocent people from bad people. Began teaching the detainee lessons such as stay, come, and bark to elevate his social status up to that of a dog. Detainee became very agitated.”

His interrogators tied a leash to him and forced him to perform a series of dog tricks.

Military dogs were used, “in an aggressive manner” to scare him.

Mohammad told his interrogators that his religion forbids him from even speaking to a woman. He was made to stand naked in front of his interrogators, including women. He was repeatedly, “subjected to the close physical presence of a woman.” Twice, military police held him down while a female interrogator straddled him.

He was told his mother and sister were whores and that he was a homosexual. He was forced to dance with a male interrogator.

During an interrogation, he was not allowed to go to the restroom and peed his pants. The log says that afterward he began to, “understand the futility of his situation…. He is much closer to compliance and cooperation than at the beginning of the operation.”

During his interrogation, Mohammad Al Qahtani confessed to attempting to be a highjacker in the 9/11 attacks. While Mohammad has retracted this confession, the US military still believes that he attempted to be a highjacker on 9/11. As we will see, his torture has made it considerably more difficult to prosecute him for his alleged attempted role in the attack.

In 2007, President Bush said that the US, “does not torture.”